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Autonomy, Domination, and the Republican 
Challenge to Liberalism 
Richard Dagger 
There was a time, not so long ago, when almost no one would have con-
sidered republicanism a challenge to liberalism. Conservatism, fascism, 
communism, and other forms of socialism were prominent on lists oflib-
eralism's rivals, but not republicanism. Historians occasionally analyzed 
the classical republics of Greece and Rome, or the role of republican 
ideas in seventeenth-century England or the American founding period, 
but republicanism itself was not a live option in contemporary politics. 1 
In recent years, however, the situation has changed dramatically. Among 
political theorists, at least, the question now is not whether republicanism 
presents a challenge to liberalism but what kind of challenge it is. 
On this question there are, broadly speaking, two points of view. Ac-
cording to one, republicanism and liberalism are fundamentally different 
schools of thought, and the republican challenge is to be welcomed or re-
sisted, depending on one's position, as an attempt to supplant or replace 
liberalism. Whole-hearted liberals thus condemn republicanism as a dan-
ger to individual liberties and free societies, while neo-republicans such as 
Michael Sandel and Philip Pettit maintain that republicanism is not only 
different from but superior to liberalism. 2 According to the other point 
of view, the features that liberalism and republicanism share are more 
telling than the differences that divide them. From this perspective, the 
republican challenge aims not at replacing or defeating liberalism but at 
correcting its course. It is in this spirit that Cass Sunstein has welcomed 
the revival of interest in republicanism 'as a response to understand-
ings that treat governmental outcomes as a kind of interest-group deal, 
and that downplay the deliberative functions of politics and the social 
formation of preferences'.'.\ The value of republicanism, on this view, is 
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in its contribution to the development of a 'liberal republicanism' that 
promises to rescue American (and other) politics from the interest-group 
pluralism into which it has degenerated. 
Like Sunstein and other advocates of 'republican' or 'civic' liberalism, 
I believe that it is historically unsound and politically unwise to insist 
on a sharp distinction between liberalism and republicanism.4 Others 
disagree, however, and there is much to be learned from their position 
even if, ultimately, we should not adopt it. Those who take this more 
radical neo-republican view advance two main lines of argument: first, 
that the liberal emphasis on neutrality and procedural fairness is fun-
damentally at odds with the republican commitment to promoting civic 
virtue; and, second, that republicans and liberals conceive of liberty or 
freedom in incompatible ways. This second line of argument is my par-
ticular concern here, for it raises the question of whether republicans 
may attach the same value to autonomy that liberals do. My claim is 
that they may, and they must as republicanism and liberalism in the end 
are both theories of self-government. Before setting out and support-
ing that claim, though, it is necessary to examine briefly the first line of 
argument. 
I Republicanism vs. Liberalism: Civic Virtue 
What is republicanism, and how might someone see it as a rival of liberal-
ism? Whole books have been written in the last few years to answer those 
questions, but a brief response might focus on the public in 'republic' .5 
Republicanism takes its name from the Latin res publica- the public thing 
or business - and contemporary republicans are quick to claim that this 
stress on the public betokens a significant difference between themselves 
and liberals. Liberals, they say, are preoccupied with liberating the indi-
vidual from restraints on his or her liberty - a preoccupation that leads 
liberals into endless contortions as they strive to distinguish the private 
realm from the public and protect it against encroachment. Republi-
cans, in contrast, recognize that individual liberty is secure only in a 
self-governing community, which means that individual rights must be 
balanced with public responsibilities if the community is to survive and 
prosper. Someone who takes these public responsibilities seriously is said 
to display civic virtue, or 'the disposition to further public over private 
good in action and deliberation'.6 
This concern for civic virtue persists today in various forms, such as the 
exhortations to vote that regularly appear, at least in the United States, at 
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election time. Another form is the suspicion that public officials are prone 
to corruption and conflicts of interest - conflicts that lead them to place 
their private interests ahead of the common good. But republicans do not 
take these signs of its persistence to mean that civic virtue is flourishing. 
If it were, there would be little point in exhorting people to vote; virtuous 
citizens would need at most a nudge to remind them to do their civic 
duty. The challenge today for those of a republican disposition is, as it 
usually has been, the challenge of finding ways to cultivate and sustain 
civic virtue. This challenge forrepublicans becomes a challenge to liberals 
because republicans believe that liberals, with their emphasis on the value 
of privacy, are either doing too little to foster civic virtue or are actively, 
if unintentionally, destroying it. In particular, liberals fail to stress the 
importance of overcoming corruption and dependence. 
Corruption is the great enemy of civic virtue, on the republican view. 
In its active form, corruption occurs when people try to advance their 
personal interests at the expense of the common good, as when avarice 
leads to the looting of the public treasury or ambition to an attempt to 
seize power. In its passive form, corruption occurs when people shirk their 
civic duties in order to pursue personal pleasures, such as those found in 
indolence, luxury, and wealth. For civic virtue to thrive, such corrupting 
vices as ambition, avarice, and sloth must be, if not eliminated, at least 
contained. 
In addition to worrying about corruption, republicans worry about de-
pendence. For republicans, the good citizen is a responsible member of 
a self-governing polity - someone who, in Aristotle's terms, rules and is 
ruled in turn.7 People who are almost completely dependent on others 
will likely be ruled, but they are surely in no position to rule. The rule 
of law is necessary, therefore, as a means of avoiding personal depen-
dence. According to the old formula, 'a government (or empire) oflaws, 
not of men', frees citizens by subjecting them to laws, not to the demands 
and whims of unchecked rulers. Republicans have also typically defended 
private property as a way of guaranteeing that citizens would not be de-
pendent on others for their livelihood. To some, this has implied that 
citizenship must be confined to that minority of men who owned suffi-
cient property to be independent; to others, such as James Harrington 
andJean:Jacques Rousseau, it has suggested that property should be dis-
tributed so as to prevent anyone from being wealthy enough to dominate 
other citizens, thus rendering them dependent. As Rousseau put it, ev-
eryone should have something, but no one should have too much.H That 
is, everyone should have enough property to he able to speak and act 
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independently - as a citizen. But no one should have so much property 
as to be corrupted by luxury or enabled to dominate others. 
Liberals, of course, may well respond that they have never advocated 
corruption or dependence as proper forms of conduct or ways of life. But 
the republican point is that liberalism quite unintentionally promotes cor-
ruption, at least in its passive form, and dependence. Or perhaps I should 
say the republican points, as here we can begin to see how republicans 
have advanced two distinct lines of criticism against liberalism. 
According to the first line of attack, liberals have promoted corruption 
by encouraging people to pursue their private interests at the expense 
of their public responsibilities. This criticism has been pressed force-
fully, with special attention to the United States, by Michael Sandel. In 
Democracy's Discontent and other works, Sandel argues that liberals are now 
engaged in a self-defeating project because their concern for neutrality 
and procedure rules out 'a formative politics ... that cultivates in citizens 
the qualities of character self-government requires'.9 In their desire to 
remain neutral among competing conceptions of the good, liberals have 
devised a thin, insubstantial form of politics that aims only to 'provide a 
framework of rights that respects persons as free and independent selves, 
capable of choosing their own values and ends'. 10 Instead of producing 
virtuous citizens who are devoted to the common good, contemporary 
liberalism produces people who think of themselves as autonomous in-
dividuals - that is, individuals who jealously guard their freedom to live 
as they choose against the encroaching demands of state and society. 
Lacking any common ground other than their agreement to disagree, 
these individuals must count on a neutral government to maintain the 
procedural safeguards that will allow them to pursue their various, and 
even discordant, conceptions of the good life. Such a 'procedural re-
public', Sandel charges, cannot sustain the loyalty and sense of solidarity 
necessary to its own survival. As he argues: 
The procedural republic that has unfolded over the past half-century can now be 
seen as an epic experiment in the claims ofliberal as against republican political 
thought. Our present predicament lends weight to the republican claim that 
liberty cannot be detached from self-government and the virtues that sustain it, 
that the formative project cannot be dispensed with after all. The procedural 
republic, it turns out, cannot secure the liberty it promises because it cannot 
inspire the moral and civic engagement self-government requires. 11 
Is Sandel right? 
He is certainly right, in my view, to insist on the need for a 'formative 
project' that will foster civic virtue; but he is wrong, as I have argued 
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elsewhere, to oppose liberalism to republicanism as sharply as he does. 12 
A strong dose of republican concern for inspiring civic virtue would be 
a valuable corrective to the tendency of many contemporary liberals to 
maintain that the state must be nothing more than an umpire or arbiter 
charged with protecting individual rights and insuring fair play. But that is 
not to say that we should throw out liberalism, root and branch, to replace 
it with republicanism. For a conception of civic virtue to prove compelling 
today, it must embrace tolerance, a sense of fair play, and respect for the 
rights of others -all of them virtues associated with liberalism, and none of 
them incompatible with republicanism. The challenge, then, is to devise 
a republican form of liberalism, or a liberal form of republicanism, that 
promises to support the 'formative politics' that will inspire a public-
spirited citizenry. 
There is, however, a second line of attack that aims at replacing liber-
alism with republicanism, and those who advance it are interested less in 
forming people for citizenship than in freeing them from dependence 
or domination. According to this criticism, as set out by Philip Pettit, 
Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, liberalism and republicanism rest 
on fundamentally different conceptions of freedom, with the republican 
superior to the liberal. 1 '.l As in Sandel's case, 1 believe that these authors 
exaggerate the difference between liberalism and republicanism. Indeed, 
Viroli himself holds that liberalism is not an alternative to republicanism 
but a form of it, albeit an 'impoverished or incoherent' form. 14 Never-
theless, the distinction these authors develop contains important insights 
about freedom and its place in the republican tradition - insights, I shall 
argue, that ultimately reveal autonomy to be a concern that republicans 
and liberals share, not one that divides them. 
II Republicanism vs. Liberalism: Freedom 
The neo-republican attempt to distinguish between republican and lib-
eral conceptions of freedom has its antecedents in two earlier, much dis-
cussed distinctions. The first was the subject of Benjamin Constant's 'The 
Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns'. According 
to Constant, the liberty of the ancients consisted in the collective exercise 
of law-making power, but that of the moderns consists above all in the 
individual's right to go about his or her business. In Constant's words: 
The aim of the ancients was the sharing of social power among the citizens of the 
same fatherland; this is what they called liberty. The aim of the moderns is the 
enjoyment of security in private pleasures; and thcY call liberty the guarantees 
afforded by institutions to these pleasures.'" 
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Constant does not connect his distinction to liberalism and republican-
ism, but it is easy to see how one might link ancient liberty to republican 
thinking and modern liberty to liberal thinking. When Constant goes on 
to condemn attempts to revive ancient liberty by insisting that 'none of 
the numerous and too highly praised institutions which in the ancient re-
publics hindered individual liberty is any longer admissible in the modern 
times', moreover, it is easy to conclude that he is rejecting the republican 
view of liberty on essentially liberal grounds. 16 
Easy, perhaps, but wrong. Constant does believe that it is both foolish 
and dangerous to try to replace modern liberty with ancient liberty, and he 
has no sympathy for those who hope to revive such ancient 'institutions' 
as ostracism and censorship. But he also holds that the moderns are in 
danger of turning their backs entirely on ancient liberty. Ancient lib-
erty 'might attach too little value to individual rights and enjoyments', 
but in words that anticipate de Tocqueville's apprehensions about 
'individualism', Constant warns that the 'danger of modern liberty is 
that, absorbed in the enjoyment of our private independence, and in 
the pursuit of our particular interests, we should surrender our right to 
share in political power too easily'. 17 It is necessary, therefore, 'to learn 
to combine the two [forms of liberty] together'. 18 Far from renouncing 
ancient liberty, in fact, Constant concludes his speech with a paragraph 
that weaves together themes now regarded as republican with themes 
often considered liberal: 
The work of the legislator is not complete when he has simply brought peace 
to the people. Even when the people are satisfied, there is much left to do. 
Institutions must achieve the moral education of the citizens. By respecting their 
individual rights, securing their independence, refraining from troubling their 
work, they must nevertheless consecrate their influence over public affairs, call 
them to contribute by their votes to the exercise of power, grant them a right 
of control and supervision by expressing their opinions; and, by forming them 
through practice for these elevated functions, give them both the desire and the right 
to discharge these. '9 
Whatever else it may do, in sum, Constant's distinction between ancient 
and modern liberty does not reveal the mutual hostility of republican 
and liberal liberty. On the contrary, it supports the claim that republican 
liberalism is both possible and plausible as a theory of politics. 
The second distinction - that between positive and negative liberty -
does not prove so helpful to the republican-liberal cause, but neither does 
it hurt it. This is because the distinction presents two problems for those 
who hold that republicanism is hostile to the liberal position on freedom. 
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The first is that the distinction itself is troublesome, even in its most 
celebrated and influential formulation by Isaiah Berlin, who generally 
defends the negative conception - that liberty is the absence of restraint-
against the positive conception of freedom as self-mastery. 20 The second 
problem is that the positive/negative distinction does not correspond 
to or 'track' the distinction between republican and liberal conceptions 
of liberty. This second problem, furthermore, besets both sides of the 
distinction. For those interested in republicanism and liberalism, the 
tendency is to take negative liberty as the liberal conception and positive 
liberty as the republican. But that makes it difficult to account for T. H. 
Green, who was both a champion of positive freedom and a self-described 
liberal. 21 It is possible, to be sure, that Green was wrong- wrong to think 
that he was a liberal, or wrong to think that a liberal can conceive ofliberty 
as 'a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something that is 
worth doing or enjoying ... in common with others'. 22 But even if Green 
were wrong in one or both of these ways, there is still the problem on 
the other side of the distinction. That is, negative liberty does not seem 
to be the exclusive property of liberals. According to Quentin Skinner, 
Machiavelli and other republicans 'never appeal to a "positive" view of 
social freedom'; instead, 'they work with a purely negative view of liberty 
as the absence of impediments to the realization of our chosen ends'. 2 3 
Whether we look to the negative or the positive side of the distinction, 
then, the answer seems to be the same: republican and liberal conceptions 
of freedom simply do not match the negative/positive distinction. 
This leaves us with the third and, for our present purposes, most 
straightforward distinction: republican versus liberal conceptions of lib-
erty. In this case, the distinction drawing comes primarily from schol-
ars sympathetic to republicanism, notably Philip Pettit and Quentin 
Skinner. Both Pettit and Skinner take the fear that personal dependence 
deprives people of their independence to be the heart of the republican 
idea of freedom, and both conceive of this as a form of negative liberty. 
For Skinner, republican, or 'neo-roman', liberty is 'absence of depen-
dence'; for Pettit, 'the supreme political value' of the republican tradition 
is 'freedom as non-domination'. Against this republican conception of 
liberty they oppose not only positive liberty, understood as self-mastery, 
but also the 'classical liberal' form of negative liberty as 'absence of 
interference'. 24 
Freedom as non-interference is the liberal view, Pettit says, because 
Thomas Hobbes,Jeremy Bentham, William Paley, and other liberals have 
held that any and all interference with our actions deprives us of (some) 
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freedom. 25 Pettit argues that this conception is unsatisfactory for two 
reasons. First, someone may suffer domination without suffering inter-
ference. If I were in someone's power, for instance, I might well see the 
need to shape my conduct to what I take to be his or her desires - and I 
might do so even ifthat person never interferes or even thinks ofinterfer-
ing with my actions. This kind of non-interfering domination happens all 
too often, according to Pettit, who provides numerous references to fawn-
ing, toadying, cap-doffing, forelock-tugging, and other forms of servile 
deference to demonstrate the evil of domination. The second objection 
is that freedom as non-interference ignores the distinction between ar-
bitrary and non-arbitrary interference. It is not interference as such that 
is objectionable, but its arbitrariness. A slave who must bow to the will of 
the master, and a citizen who must bow to the force of the law, may both 
suffer interference; but it is a mistake to say that they both lose freedom 
as a result. The master holds arbitrary power over the slave because the 
master need not consider the slave's interests; but the law, at least in the 
ideal, must attend to the interests of the citizen even when it interferes 
with his or her actions. Because it protects the citizen against arbitrary 
power, the law is 'the non-mastering interferer' that ensures the citizen's 
freedom. 26 
Freedom as non-domination thus rests on 'the frankness of intersub-
jective equality'. 2 7 The law may happen to interfere with my conduct 
more than with yours, yet we stand eye to eye and are equally free as citi-
zens. This independence from arbitrary power is so valuable, Pettit says, 
that it is a 'primary good' in the Rawlsian sense. Whatever else people may 
want, they will want to be free from domination because they then will 
have the ability to make plans, to speak freely, and simply to be persons; 
for 'everyone - or at least everyone who has to make their [sic] way in a 
pluralistic society-will want to be treated properly as a person, as a voice 
that cannot be generally ignored'.28 
For Pettit, then, freedom as non-domination is the good to be secured 
and promoted by the neo-republican political institutions and practices 
he sketches in the second half of Republicanism; and, as goods go, it is bet-
ter than the 'liberal' good of freedom as non-interference. If the choice 
must be posed in these terms, in short, I agree with him. Domination is 
always a threat to freedom; interference is not. But that is not to say that 
interference is no threat to liberty, nor is it to say that the republican and 
liberal conceptions ofliberty are mutually exclusive and hostile. The key 
point is that both domination and interference threaten and limit free-
dom because both are at odds with autonomy. I say this for three reasons. 
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First, as the traditional republican opposition of dependence to inde-
pendence indicates, the desire to be free from domination is rooted in 
the desire to be in some sense self-governing. Why else would we com-
plain about being dominated by or dependent upon another person? 
Pettit says that people want to be free from domination so that they may 
enjoy 'the frankness of intersubjective equality' and be treated as voices 
'that cannot be generally ignored'. To be on an equal footing with those 
who would dominate us, however, or ignore our voices, is to be in a posi-
tion to govern our lives, just as they do theirs. That does not mean that a 
person can or should even want to be the complete master of his or her 
domain. The attempt to achieve that kind of self-mastery is likely to lead 
to the self-stifling 'retreat to the inner citadel' that Berlin rightly deplores 
in 'Two Concepts of Liberty'. 2 9 Instead, being in a position to govern our 
lives means, among other things, that we must be able to rely upon the 
impersonal force of the rule of law to secure our independence from 
the arbitrary power of others. And that implies, in turn, that we must 
rely on our fellow citizens, whose general cooperation and compliance 
makes the rule of law possible. It is as interdependent citizens, then, that 
we can stand on an equal footing with others in making and following 
the laws that protect us from arbitrary power, and in that sense we can be 
self-governing. We want to be free from domination, in other words, so 
that we can exercise autonomy. 
Second, Pettit's emphasis on non-domination leads to some odd con-
clusions about when a person gains or loses (some degree of) freedom. 
In the postscript to the paperback edition of Republicanism, Pettit de-
clares that 'the republic does not take away the freedom of citizens when 
it legally coerces them, taxes them, or even puts them in prison'.'.l" If the 
republic has rightfully imprisoned a culprit, then it is easy to see how 
his or her imprisonment does not in itself constitute domination. But 
this simply means that one may lose some freedom while remaining free 
from domination. Put in other terms - terms congenial to republicans and 
liberals alike - Pettit's point seems to be that people do not lose their au-
tonomy when they are coerced, taxed, or imprisoned in accordance with 
laws that somehow issue from them as self-governing citizens. Identifying 
freedom with non-domination, however, leads him to hold that people 
in these positions do not suffer a loss of freedom - an embarrassment 
easily avoided by those who take autonomy to be the reason for worrying 
about both interference and domination. 
The third reason to prefer autonomy to 'freedom as non-domination' 
relates to the distinction Pettit draws between ways in which freedom is 
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compromised and ways in which it is conditioned. This distinction allows him 
to say 'that someone is unfree so far as their [sic] freedom is compromised 
by domination' and 'nonfree, though not strictly unfree ... insofar as their 
[sic] freedom is subject to conditioningfactors'Y I may be free from the 
domination of arbitrary power, yet various conditioning factors - physical 
handicaps, illness, ignorance, and so on - may nevertheless limit my free-
dom. This consideration leads Pettit to a priority rule. Republicans must 
act to promote non-domination first by abolishing or reducing arbitrary 
power; that done, they must then extend the range of undominated choices 
available to people: 'we ought to try and reduce influences that condi-
tion freedom as well as influences that compromise it' .32 Again, I believe 
Pettit to be right on this point, but it is difficult to see how he is right if 
freedom is to be construed simply as non-domination. If that is what free-
dom is, then why should the republican do anything more than secure 
people from domination? There are no obviously republican grounds, 
that is, for wanting to remove or overcome those conditioning factors 
that render people 'non-free'. We do not face this problem, however, 
if we turn from non-domination to autonomy. We can then say that the 
conditioning factors limit or inhibit the ability to lead a self-governed life, 
which is reason enough to try to remove them. Extending the range of un-
dominated choices is thus desirable for the same reason that eliminating 
domination is desirable: namely, both are ways of promoting autonomy. 
On conceptual grounds, then, Pettit's way of distinguishing republican 
liberty from liberal liberty is suspect. The same must be said of its histor-
ical warrant. The distinction does underscore a signal feature of repub-
licanism, but it also leads to a caricature of liberalism in which Hobbes, 
Bentham, Paley, and today's libertarians - all advocates of freedom as 
non-interference - are the principal liberals. In Republicanism, Pettit ap-
peals more than once to Locke's observation (Second Treatise, §s7) that 
the laws that hedge us in from bogs and precipices ill deserve the name of 
confinement, but he has to assign Locke to the commonwealth tradition 
to preserve the distinction between republican and liberal freedom.33 
Nor does he mention Green, John Dewey, or other liberals who have 
not defined freedom as non-interference, although he does admit in the 
postscript that John Rawls's conception of freedom 'is consistent with lib-
erty requiring non-domination as well as non-interference' .34 He would 
have done better to rely on what he says, in the Introduction to Republican-
ism, may be 'the best available' taxonomy: 'populist, republican/liberal, 
and libertarian'.35 
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In subsequent writings, in fact, Pettit retains and elaborates the dis-
tinction between 'freedom as non-domination' and 'freedom as non-
interference', but he no longer explicitly associates the latter with lib-
eralism. In A Theory of Freedom, he hints at the desirability of 'a liberal 
or inclusive form of republican theory', and he grounds his theory of 
freedom in the idea of discursive control.36 The latter point is significant 
because Pettit's notion of a 'discursive subject' who enjoys 'discursive 
control' closely resembles the idea of an autonomous person. 'To en-
joy discursive control', as he says, 'is to be proof against being silenced, 
or ignored, or refused a hearing, or denied the final say in one's own 
responses. It is, on the contrary, to be given recognition as a discursive 
subject with a voice and an ear of one's own'.37 
These are salutary moves on Pettit's part. As he now seems to recog-
nize, freedom as non-interference may be the view of freedom that many 
liberals hold, but it is hardly the only one available to them as liberals. 
There is another conception of freedom, encompassing the idea of non-
domination but resting on the concept of autonomy, that is available to 
liberals and republicans alike. 
Yet this conclusion, correct as I believe it to be, is too hasty. Pettit may 
no longer oppose the republican conception to the liberal conception of 
liberty, but his continued insistence on excluding non-interference from 
republican liberty stands in the way of an autonomy-based conception 
of republican freedom. 'Freedom just is non-domination', according to 
Pettit.38 This claim puts him at odds with Quentin Skinner, who has his 
own reasons for resisting attempts to link republican, or neo-roman, lib-
erty to autonomy. So, too, does Maurizio Viroli, who endorses Pettit's 
conception of 'freedom as non-domination' while holding that republi-
canism is incompatible with democratic autonomy. It will be necessary, 
then, to attend to the ways in which these neo-republicans have qualified 
and elaborated their views on freedom before proceeding to autonomy 
itself. 
III Qualifications and Elaborations 
II/a Pettit vs. Skinner 
Pettit and Skinner both acknowledge how much each one's analysis of 
freedom owes to insights gained from the other. It is hardly surprising, 
then, to find them agreeing on t\vo fundamental points: first, that there 
is a distinctively republican or, as Skinner prefers, nco-roman conception 
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of liberty; and second, that this conception is superior to its two rivals, 
freedom as self-mastery and freedom as non-interference. Nevertheless, 
there are three points of disagreement that separate them. 
The first may be no more than an insignificant difference in terminol-
ogy. Where Pettit takes republican liberty to be freedom from domination, 
Skinner defines it as freedom from dependence. Neither of them makes an 
issue of this difference, so far as I am aware, so I shall set it aside here. 
The second point of disagreement arises with regard to Berlin's way 
of distinguishing negative from positive liberty. Skinner and Pettit agree 
that Berlin's two concepts are not enough, but they disagree on how to 
classify the republican conception. On Skinner's account, there is one 
concept of positive liberty, understood as self-mastery, but there are two 
competing concepts of negative liberty: the idea that 'negative liberty 
must be construed as absence of interference ... ' and 'the rival theory 
that negative liberty consists of absence of dependence'.39 On Pettit's 
account, however, the republican conception ofliberty 
is akin to the negative one in maintaining that what liberty requires is the absence 
of something, not necessarily the presence. It is akin to the positive conception, 
however, in holding that that which must be absent has to do with mastery rather 
than with interference. Freedom consists, not in the presence of self-mastery, and 
not in the absence of interference by others, but rather in the absence of mastery 
by others: in the absence, as I prefer to put it, of domination.4° 
Whether this is a significant difference is again not clear. Pettit does not 
refer to Skinner in this context, so there is no reason to think that he is 
trying to separate their positions here. And I suspect that Skinner would 
simply point out that Pettit's 'absence of mastery' is every bit as negative 
as his own 'absence of dependence', with freedom in both cases defined 
as the absence of something. 
There is no question, though, that the third point of disagreement 
is significant. Indeed, Pettit has recently defended his 'simple' position 
against objections that Skinner presents in Liberty Before Liberalism. Accord-
ing to Pettit, the difference between them is clear: 'I hold that for republi-
cans freedom means non domination, period, whereas [Skinner] says that 
it means nondomination and nonintcrference'.4' The question, then, is 
why do they disagree on this point, and who has the better position? 
Skinner holds that Pettit's simple identification of freedom with non-
domination is mistaken because it leads to the unacceptably paradoxical 
situations I have already discussed - situations in which someone's appar-
ent loss of freedom cannot count as real because the interference was 
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not the result of mastery or domination but of lawful procedures. Ac-
cording to Skinner, 'The [neo-roman] writers I am discussing never deal 
in such paradoxes. For them the difference between the rule of law and 
government by personal prerogative is not that the former leaves you in 
full possession of your liberty while the latter does not; it is rather that the 
former only coerces you while the latter additionally leaves you in a state 
of dependence' .42 Thus the person who is jailed or otherwise coerced 
in accordance with the laws of a genuine republic suffers a real loss of 
freedom - freedom from interference or restraint - even if it is not as 
grievous or objectionable a deprivation as it would be if some arbitrary, 
unaccountable power were doing the jailing or coercing. 
For Pettit, as we have seen, the person in question suffers no loss of 
freedom because there is a difference between having one's freedom com-
promised, which makes one unfree, and having it conditioned, which makes 
one nonfree. Pettit rehearses this argument from Republicanism in his re-
sponse to Skinner, stating that 'while the tax levy or even the term of im-
prisonment might not take away a person's freedom in an ideal world -
they might not have the effect of a dominating agency - still they would 
leave the person nonfree: "while they do not compromise someone's free-
dom as non-domination they do allow us to say that the person is not free 
to spend or to travel as they [sic] wish"'.43 
This argument, however, does not dispel the air of paradox that quite 
properly worries Skinner. How can it when Pettit tells us, in one sentence 
(emphasis added), that non-dominating interference 'might not take 
away a person's freedom', yet 'it would leave the person non free', and thus 
'allow us to say that the person is not free to spend or travel' as he or she 
wishes? If enforcement of a non-dominating law deprives me of (some 
of) my freedom to spend or travel, and thus makes me non-free in these 
respects, then the enforcement of the law must take away my freedom -
or at least some of it. 
Pettit's argument here strikes me as insightful but unsuccessful in two 
ways. First, the distinction between forces that render us unfree by compro-
mising our freedom and those that render us nonjree by merely condition-
ing it does reflect common reactions to different kinds of experiences. In 
Pettit's example, the victim of a crime and the victim of an accident may 
both suffer an equal reduction in their range of choice, but we would 
hardly say that the evil they suffer is equivalent: 
The evil of reduced choice is certainly important, but it is distinct from the evil 
involved in the assumption and exercise of domi11;1tion bv the criminal; it is this 
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evil that explains why, intuitively, it is worse to have one's choices reduced by 
crime than by an unintended, perhaps purely natural, accident.44 
We may grant Pettit this point, however, without granting that his 
unfree/non-free distinction captures the difference in question. We 
could even say that it is not freedom but wrongdoing that is at issue in 
these cases. It is worse, that is, to have one's choices reduced by crime 
than by accident not because the criminal's victim is made 'unfree' but 
because he suffers a greater wrong, ceteris paribus, than the victim of an 
accident. The unfree/non-free distinction thus seems to be Pettit's ad 
hoc way of trying to tie this point to considerations of freedom. 
To be sure, Pettit might respond by saying that the wrong suffered 
by the crime victim is directly and inextricably connected to freedom as 
non-domination. He might invoke 'discursive control' or 'the frankness 
of intersubjective equality', pointing out that the criminal or dominating 
power wrongs the victim by treating him or her as less than an equal, or as 
someone other than 'a discursive subject with a voice and an ear of one's 
own' .45 To take this line, however, is to say that people ought or perhaps 
have a right to be treated as free persons capable of leading their own lives. 
This is to build freedom from non-domination into the idea of being a 
person, so that the wrong the dominated person suffers is the wrong of 
not being respected as someone with a right to live, think, and speak for 
himself. In short, it is an implicit appeal to autonomy that is doing the 
work here, not the distinction between unfreedom and non-freedom. 
Something similar happens with regard to the second way in which 
Pettit's argument is insightful but unsuccessful. In seeking to avoid the 
paradoxical situations that trouble Skinner, Pettit trades on the sense in 
which freedom is a threshold concept. That is, someone who has all the 
freedom it is possible to have is a free person; someone who completely 
lacks freedom, whether from domination or interference, is not; and 
between these poles is some vague, imprecise, and perhaps shifting point 
or range of points that forms a threshold of freedom. If I am above that 
threshold, I am a free person, no matter that I am not completely free, 
or free in all respects. I can be more or less free above the threshold, and 
more or less free below it, but if I am above it, I am free enough to count 
as a free person, all things considered. It is this threshold that enables us 
to make sense of Pettit's claim that the (non-arbitrary, non-dominating) 
tax levy both does and does not take away the tax-payer's freedom - in 
his terms, makes her non-free but not unfree. The tax payer is not as 
free to spend as she would be in the absence of the tax, but her loss of 
Domination and the Republican Challenge to Liberalism i g i 
freedom is not great enough to make her an unfree person. If she goes 
to prison for tax evasion, it will be more difficult to make the case that 
she has not crossed the threshold that renders her an unfree person, 
but I will concede this point to Pettit for our present purposes. What 
should be noted, though, is that we could make the same point in the 
preceding two sentences if we were to substitute 'non-free' for 'unfree'. 
Someone who loses some degree of freedom, but not enough to drop 
below the threshold, remains a free person - that is, someone who is 
neither unfree nor non-free, all things considered. This tells us that it is 
the threshold that counts, not Pettit's distinction between compromising 
and conditioning factors that make us unfree and non-free, respectively. 
Pettit's argument is insightful but ultimately unsuccessful, in sum, be-
cause he can dispel the paradox from the situations that worry Skinner 
only by trading implicitly on considerations that take him beyond his 
'simple' conception ofrepublican freedom as 'non-domination, period'. 
Indeed, Skinner could trade as effectively on these considerations as Pettit 
does. On the one hand, he could hold that someone who suffers interfer-
ence but not domination loses (some) freedom while remaining a free 
person; on the other, he could hold that someone who suffers domina-
tion does not become ipso facto an unfree person. Like interference or 
restraint, domination comes in various forms and degrees, some of which 
will be sufficient to push one below the threshold of freedom and some 
of which will not. Skinner could trade on these considerations, moreover, 
without abandoning his claim that republican or neo-roman liberty in-
volves the absence of domination (or dependence) and the absence of 
interference. 
Nevertheless, Pettit has two more arguments against Skinner's posi-
tion. Both of these follow from Pettit's belief that Skinner's neo-roman 
liberty places non-domination and non-interference on an equal basis. 
Hence Pettit argues, first, that domination alone ought to be considered 
the antonym of freedom, and, second, that Skinner's conception of lib-
erty is unstable. Pettit is right, I think, to stress that non-domination is 
the distinctive aspect of republican freedom; and if 'freedom'. must have 
a republican antonym, then I would only enter the quibble that there is 
something to be said for 'dependence' too. Otherwise, I readily accept 
the following claim: 
What is bad about domination, and makes it a natural antonym of freedom, 
shows up in the three features of enforcing a restriction of choice, occasioning 
a distinctive uncertainty [because the dominated person is never sure of where 
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he stands or what to expect,] and introducing an asymmetry of status [between 
dominator and dominated]. What is bad about interference-minus-domination 
is merely that it restricts choice. 46 
In accepting this claim, though, I note that one may still hold to the 
view that 'interference-minus-domination' remains a part of republican 
liberty. After all, there is a difference between saying that non-domination 
is the distinctively republican feature of republican liberty and saying that 
it is the whole of it. 
Pettit's final argument concerns the purported instability of Skinner's 
conception. Here, Pettit identifies three possibilities: freedom as non-
domination, freedom as non-domination and non-interference, and free-
dom as non-limitation (where limitation 'may come of natural inability 
or handicap or poverty or from the lack of resources available as the 
unintended result of the action or inaction of others'47). The middle 
view - Skinner's - is in danger of sliding into the third, Pettit says, be-
cause it cannot identify an evil that is common to domination and in-
terference but not to non-intentional limitation.48 If interference is on 
an equal footing with domination because both restrict people's choices, 
then non-intentional limitations may be on an equal footing with them 
too. We must therefore reject the second position in favour of simple 
freedom as non-domination, with its three features, if we are to avoid the 
slide down the slippery slope to freedom as non-limitation. 
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that Pettit does 
not explain why it would be so dreadful to adopt or slide into the con-
ception of freedom that counts non-intentional limitations as every bit 
as inimical to one's freedom as domination or interference. Presumably 
to do so would be to open the door to considerations that republicans 
should not want to count as compromising one's freedom; but to say 
that is simply to reaffirm Pettit's conviction that republican liberty is free-
dom from domination. Even if we grant this point, moreover, the second 
problem remains - namely, that Pettit's conception of republican liberty 
may be as likely to slide into non-limitation as Skinner's. Pettit acknowl-
edges that domination shares one of its three features, the restriction of 
choice, with both interference and limitation; but it seems that domina-
tion also shares the other two features - 'a distinctive uncertainty' and 'an 
asymmetry of status' - with limitation. In fact, people limited by 'natural 
inability or handicap or poverty or ... the lack of resources available as 
the unintended result of the action or inaction of others' are quite likely 
to feel a distinctive uncertainty as to how to conduct themselves; they 
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are also likely to perceive an asymmetry of status in their relations with 
others. It is also true that some people see domination in what others 
regard as mere limitation. For example, the poverty that seems to some 
to be the unfortunate result of natural factors and innocent actions may 
appear to Marxists to be a consequence of capitalist domination. As this 
and many other possible examples illustrate, the slope leading to free-
dom as non-limitation seems as slippery for non-domination as it is for 
non-interference. 
My conclusion, then, is that Skinner's conception of republican lib-
erty is superior to Pettit's. Like Pettit's, Skinner's conception contains 
the distinctive feature that makes it republican: the emphasis on freedom 
as non-domination or independence. But Skinner's also allows that in-
terference may sometimes 'compromise' freedom - indeed, that it may 
sometimes compromise freedom more severely than domination does. 
Such would be the case, I think, for the person who is wrongly convicted 
of a serious crime and imprisoned for many years, or perhaps even exe-
cuted, even though his arrest, trial, and conviction proceeded fairly and 
in accordance with the republican ideal of the rule of law. Such a person 
would not be dominated, in Pettit's sense, but he would be less free by 
far than someone who must occasionally bow and scrape to the boss in 
order to keep his job. 
There is an irony here, however. Pettit's recent writings, and especially 
his acknowledgment of the desirability of 'a liberal or inclusive form of 
republican theory', have brought him closer than Skinner to the posi-
tion I favour. He may conceive of liberty more inclusively than Pettit, but 
Skinner does not regard this inclusive conception as evidence that re-
publicanism and liberalism share a common foundation in autonomy. In 
this respect, he resembles Maurizio Viroli, another neo-republican who 
has his doubts about the relationship of republicanism to autonomy. 
!fib Republicanism vs. Autonomy? 
Skinner's remarks on republicanism and autonomy are confiµed, so far 
as I know, to a footnote in Liberty Before Liberalism. There he states that 
one 'might say that the neo-roman and classical liberal accounts of free-
dom embody rival understandings of autonomy. For the latter, the will 
is autonomous provided it is not coerced; for the former, the will can 
only be described as autonomous ifit is independent of the danger of be-
ing coerced'.49 On this account, republicanism and liberalism both have 
foundations in autonomy, but not a common or shared foundation. What 
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Skinner's footnote does, in effect, is push the purported rivalry between 
liberal and republican conceptions of liberty up, down, or back a level to 
a rivalry between liberal and republican conceptions of autonomy. 
Is this move justified? In the absence of a richer account of autonomy 
than Skinner provides, it is hard to see how it is. Of course, if we already 
believe that republicanism and liberalism are sharply distinct and incom-
patible, then we would expect either that one of the two theories lacks a 
conception of autonomy altogether or that their conceptions are quite 
different from each other. But that is to assume precisely what is in ques-
tion here; and Skinner offers no evidence to show that 'neo-romans' and 
liberals really do differ as he says with regard to autonomy. Moreover, the 
'rival understandings of autonomy' Skinner identifies both rest, like his 
neo-roman and liberal conceptions ofliberty, on a common element- in 
this case, coercion. The 'liberal' view is that autonomy is the absence of 
coercion; the 'neo-roman' is that autonomy is the absence 'of the danger 
of being coerced'. Assuming that Skinner means to include the absence 
of coercion itself in the neo-roman/republican view, and not merely the 
danger of it, the result is an inclusive conception of autonomy. In this 
respect, neo-roman autonomy as the absence of coercion and of the dan-
ger of being coerced is like his neo-roman conception of liberty as the 
absence of interference and of dependence. But that is to say that in both 
cases, the neo-roman/republican position absorbs and extends the sup-
posedly liberal position, not that it rejects it. If this is rivalry, then it is 
rivalry of a friendly and intramural nature. 
As with Pettit, in sum, so with Skinner. Both have made valuable con-
tributions to our understandings of republicanism and of freedom, but 
neither has shown that the republican conception of freedom is so dif-
ferent from or hostile to (what they take to be) the liberal conception 
as to demonstrate that liberalism and republicanism are fundamentally 
incompatible. But what of Viroli, who distinguishes republican liberty 
not only from the liberal but also from the democratic ideal of liberty as 
autonomy? 
Viroli's understanding of republican liberty is in line with Pettit's: 
'The central point for classical republican theorists is that dependence 
is a more painful violation ofliberty than interference'.5° Viroli extends 
Pettit's analysis, however, when he associates democratic liberty with au-
tonomy. As he puts it: 
The democratic ideal of political liberty, understood as a condition in which 
citizens have autonomy and are governed by laws that reflect their will, is in 
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fact a radical version of the republican ideal of political liberty as absence of 
domination. If to be free means that one is not subject to the arbitrary will of a 
man or group, as republican theorists claim, we enjoy complete political liberty 
when we are dependent only on our own will - that is, when we live in a self-
goveming polity that permits us to approve or reject the rules governing the life 
of the collectivity.5' 
As stated here, the democratic ideal of political liberty may not seem 
to be a truly 'radical' departure from the republican ideal. As a citizen 
of 'a self-governing polity that permits us', my fellow citizens and me, 
'to approve or reject the rules governing the life of the collectivity', I 
apparently enjoy 'complete political liberty' in both the republican and 
democratic senses. But Viroli has something much stronger in mind when 
he refers to approving or rejecting the rules governing the polity. To enjoy 
democratic autonomy in his sense of the term, I must be able not only to 
have a say or cast a vote, but to approve or reject each and every law of 
the polity - and so must every other citizen. The 'radical' nature of this 
democratic ideal emerges in the following passage: 
The republican conception of political liberty approaches the democratic idea 
of liberty as autonomy of the will in that it, too, sees constraint as a violation of 
liberty; yet it is not identical, because it holds that the will is autonomous not when 
the laws or regulations that govern my actions correspond to my will, but when I am 
protected from the constant danger of being subjected to constraint." 2 
By implication, then, I am not autonomous according to the democratic 
ideal unless I have the power to veto any law or regulation that I disap-
prove. No wonder that this account of democratic liberty as autonomy of 
the will appears in a chapter entitled 'The New Utopia of Liberty'! 
What are we to make of this conception of democratic autonomy? 
Viroli presumably wants us to reject it in favour of the more sensible 
republican ideal of liberty, but others may try to turn the tables on him 
by using it to reject republicanism. Robert Paul Wolff, for one, relies 
on much the same notion of autonomy - 'the refusal to be ruled' - yet 
Wolff argues for 'philosophical anarchism' because unanimous direct 
democracy is impossible to achieve, and anything less is incompatible 
with autonomy.53 In any case, there is no reason to accept this radical 
view as the democratic conception of autonomy. None of the chapters in 
the present volume, for example, entails or even implies that a person 
is autonomous only when she is able to approve or reject every rule or 
law that applies to her; indeed, Rainer Forst's and Bert van den Brink's 
separate discussions of 'political autonomy' resemble Viroli 's republican 
ig6 Richard Dagger 
ideal much more closely than his 'democratic idea ofliberty as autonomy 
of the will ... ' (see Chapters 10 and 11 in the present volume). 
Nor does Viroli himself hold, in the end, that republicanism is thor-
oughly hostile to autonomy. As he says, the 'republican conception of 
political liberty approaches the democratic idea of liberty as autonomy of 
the will .. .' (emphasis added). It does this because freedom from domi-
nation or from dependence upon the arbitrary rule of others enables a 
person to be self-governing in a meaningful sense of that term even when 
that person must sometimes accept a rule or law that he or she did not 
approve. To see how such a person can be autonomous, however, and 
how autonomy underpins a republican-liberal political theory, requires, 
finally, a closer look at the concept of autonomy itself. 
IV Autonomy 
As the chapters in this and other volumes testify, autonomy is a rich and 
multi-faceted concept.54 In the space remaining, I cannot even pretend 
to approach a comprehensive treatment of the subject, but I can offer 
remarks on four points that are especially pertinent to the republican 
challenge to liberalism. 
The first point begins with the basic observation that autonomy is a 
matter of self-government. This observation may seem to be singularly un-
helpful, as it leads to difficult questions about the nature of the self and 
how it may be said to govern - questions such as the nature of the relation-
ship between personal and moral autonomy that Gerald Gaus and Jeremy 
Waldron explore in Chapters 12 and i3, respectively, in the present vol-
ume. Nevertheless, this basic observation provides a useful starting point, 
as it indicates that autonomy is something available only to people who 
have both a reasonably secure sense of self and the ability to govern their 
conduct. Someone who suffers from multiple-personality disorder can-
not be autonomous; nor, as the film Memento illustrates, can someone 
who cannot remember whom he has just met, where he has just gone, 
what he has just said, or how any of these fit into his plans or purposes. 
Less dramatically, people who are unable to resist any impulse that strikes 
them also lack autonomy, for they are incapable of self-government. 
It is equally important to notice that external forces can prevent some-
one who is quite capable of self-government from exercising this capacity. 
This may happen, for instance, when a person who could be autonomous 
is subject to constant interference or coercion; it may also happen when 
such a person is dominated by or utterly dependent upon others. This 
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is why autonomy is a concern of liberals and republicans alike - and of 
those who believe that republican liberalism is an especially powerful po-
litical theory. Autonomy is the capacity to lead a self-governed life, but 
this capacity, like others, will atrophy if it is not exercised. Liberals, re-
publicans, and republican liberals will all have an interest in protecting 
people, or enabling them to protect themselves, against interference or 
domination that threatens their ability to govern themselves. There will 
be disagreements and differences of emphasis among them, to be sure, 
but their fundamental concern for self-government demonstrates that re-
publicans and liberals share a common foundation in their commitment 
to autonomy. 
This claim leads to my second point about autonomy: it is not the 
peculiarly liberal concept that critics of liberalism sometimes take it to 
be. These critics are doubly mistaken, in my view, as they misconceive 
both liberalism and autonomy. Mark Tushnet provides a colorful case in 
point: 
Liberalism's psychology posits a world of autonomous individuals, each guided 
by his or her own idiosyncratic values and goals, none of which can be adjudged 
more or less legitimate than those held by others. In such a world, people exist 
as isolated islands of individuality who choose to enter into relations that can 
metaphorically be characterized as foreign affairs.55 
Setting aside the caricature of liberalism here, the pertinent question is 
whether autonomous individuals really are 'isolated islands of individu-
ality'. The answer, quite clearly, is no. Autonomous individuals must be 
able to make choices, certainly, including the choice to enter into and 
break off various relations with others. But that is hardly to say that one 
is autonomous only if he or she takes part in nothing but self-chosen 
relationships.56 We are born, most of us, with the capacity to lead self-
governed lives, but we cannot develop or exercise this capacity without 
the assistance of other people, and it would be silly to think of our rela-
tions with all of them, even metaphorically, as 'foreign affairs'. Even as 
mature and presumably independent adults, we find ourselves entangled 
in relationships - with relatives, neighbors, co-workers. compatriots, and 
others - that we have not fully chosen. Yet we may still be reflective per-
sons capable of judging the options available to us and making choices 
in light of those judgments. In short, we may achieve autonomy despite 
our inability to become 'isolated islands of individuality'. 
As these remarks suggest, autonomy is not a simple on/ off concept -
something that one either does or docs not have. On the contrary, one 
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autonomous person may have more or less autonomy than another; or 
someone may be autonomous in one aspect of her life but not in an-
other. In most discussions of personal autonomy, however, we are talking 
in global terms of whether this or that person or group of people should 
be deemed, all things considered, to be autonomous. We can do this -
and this is my third point - because autonomy, like freedom, is a thresh-
old concept. That is why someone who gives in to every impulse will not 
be autonomous, ceteris paribus, but someone who occasionally acts impul-
sively may be. One need not be perfectly autonomous, in other words, in 
order to be autonomous. It is only necessary to go beyond that vaguely 
defined threshold that distinguishes the autonomous from those who are 
not (quite) autonomous. 
This is an especially important point in the present context because it 
helps to resolve those paradoxical situations that have worried Skinner 
and bedeviled Pettit. As we have seen, Pettit resorts to a distinction be-
tween 'unfree' and 'non-free' in his attempt to explain how someone 
who experiences non-arbitrary interference, such as the imposition of 
a tax levy, may not suffer a loss of freedom. In making this move, I ar-
gued, Pettit implicitly trades on the sense in which freedom is a threshold 
concept; and a more straightforward way to deal with the problem is to 
say that the person subject to the levy remains a free person even though 
she is not as free to spend as she was before the levy. An even better way 
to resolve the problem is to employ the concept of autonomy. Doing so 
certainly makes it easier to handle the case of the person whose impris-
onment seems, almost by definition, to drop her below the threshold 
that separates the free person from the unfree. It is easier, at least, if we 
have reason to believe that the prisoner committed the crime of her own 
volition in full knowledge of the illegality of her act and of its likely con-
sequences. To say that this prisoner remains a free person strains, at best, 
the concept of freedom. Yet there is little strain, if any, in describing the 
prisoner as autonomous but not free. That is because 'autonomy', unlike 
'freedom' or 'liberty', is typically used to characterize persons in a global 
sense. I may ask whether you are free this weekend, but only in frivolity 
or in a philosophy seminar would I ask whether you are autonomous 
this weekend. The threshold element is stronger in autonomy than in 
freedom, in short, because autonomy is more of a global concept than 
freedom. 
These considerations lead to my final point, which is that a commit-
ment to autonomy does not also commit one to the populist or plebisc-
itary forms of democracy that Pettit and Viroli deplore. If we want our 
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political arrangements to respect individual autonomy, or to acknowledge 
that people are 'discursive subjects' with voices and ears of their own, 
those arrangements will have to be in some sense democratic. But auton-
omy does not require unanimous direct democracy, for a person does not 
cease to be autonomous whenever a vote goes contrary to his wishes. Nor 
does autonomy require unbridled majority rule. Indeed, majority rule is 
both friend and foe of autonomy: friend because it is the only decision 
procedure that gives equal weight to everyone's vote, and Joe because it 
may allow those who constitute the majority to dominate those in the 
minority. As Viroli remarks, a 'law accepted voluntarily by members of 
the most democratic assembly on earth may very well be an arbitrary law 
that permits some part of the society to constrain the will of other parts, 
thus depriving them of their autonomy'. '57 
Viroli 's remark is important both for what it says about the threat that 
an excess of democracy poses to self-government and for what it implies 
about republicanism and liberalism. As the words I have italicized indi-
cate, Viroli's defense of republican liberty against unchecked majoritari-
anism is entirely consistent with a commitment to autonomy. But it is also 
consistent with liberal fears that individual rights and liberties will fall vic-
tim to the tyranny of the majority. That is why the rule of law, separation 
of powers, checks and balances, and other devices for constraining the 
majority are neither peculiarly republican nor distinctively liberal. That 
is also why republicans and liberals alike should be concerned with prob-
lems such as permanent or persistent majorities, which inevitably lead 
the people who are on the losing side of almost every vote to ask whether 
they are really self-governing or merely subject to the domination of the 
majority. It is, in sum, the commitment to autonomy that unites repub-
licans and liberals in their quest for political arrangements that protect 
and promote the individual's ability to be self-governing. In this, as in 
other respects, there is no reason to regard republicanism and liberalism 
as hostile or even sharply divided political theories. 
V The Republican Challenge to Liberalism 
What, then, is the nature of the republican challenge to liberalism? It 
is the challenge to take more seriously the commitment to individual 
autonomy. Liberals too often seem to think that respecting autonomy is 
simply a matter of leaving people alone to pursue their own conceptions 
of the good, at least as long as they do not harm or violate the rights of 
others. Many liberals are thus vulnerable to the two lines of attack that 
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neo-republicans have brought against them: first, as Sandel and others 
have urged, that liberal societies give too little attention to the cultiva-
tion of the civic virtues necessary to sustain a self-governing polity; and 
second, as Pettit, Skinner, and Viroli insist, that freeing people from in-
terference is not the same as enabling them to be free, self-governing 
persons. Anyone who hopes to foster autonomy will do well to take these 
criticisms seriously. For liberals, this means that they should correct their 
course where necessary to respond to the republican challenge. 
Can this be done? The examples of Constant, John Stuart Mill, and 
other liberals who have displayed markedly republican tendencies indi-
cate that it can. For Constant, as we have seen, the challenge is to cherish 
'modern' liberty while guarding against the danger that, 'absorbed in the 
ertjoyment of our private independence, and in the pursuit of our partic-
ular interests, we should surrender our right to share in political power 
too easily' .58 For his part, Mill gave classical expression to the 'liberal' 
view of freedom: 'The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of 
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to 
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it' .59 But he also 
denied, in Considerations on Representative Government, that a truly benevo-
lent despotism is the ideal form of government, and he called attention 
to the evil of domination in The Subjection of Wornen. That is not to say, of 
course, that Mill and Constant were always right, or that their writings ex-
haust the possibilities of republican liberalism or liberal republicanism. 
What these writings do show, however, in line with the arguments set out 
in this chapter, is that a republican liberalism is not only possible but, for 
anyone committed to the promotion of autonomy, remarkably attractive 
as a theory of politics.60 
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